Abstract-In many traditional mobile network scenarios, nodes establish communication on the basis of persistent public identities. However, in some hostile and suspicious MANET settings, node identities must not be exposed and node movements must be untraceable. Instead, nodes need to communicate on the basis of nothing more than their current locations. In this paper, we address some interesting issues arising in such MANETs by designing an anonymous routing framework (ALARM). It uses nodes' current locations to construct a secure MANET map. Based on the current map, each node can decide which other nodes it wants to communicate with. ALARM takes advantage of some advanced cryptographic primitives to achieve node authentication, data integrity, anonymity and untraceability (tracking resistance). It that the MANET nodes do not even trust each other, perhaps because of possible node compromise (i.e., the environment is "suspicious"), the need to hide node identities becomes more pressing. Moreover, in a suspicious MANET environment, it is natural to require that node movements be obscured, such that tracking a given node (even without knowing its identity) is impossible or, at least, very difficult. While we do not claim that such suspicious and hostile MANET environments are (or will be) common, they do occur in military and law enforcement domains.
need to communicate on the basis of nothing more than their current locations. In this paper, we address some interesting issues arising in such MANETs by designing an anonymous routing framework (ALARM). It uses nodes' current locations to construct a secure MANET map. Based on the current map, each node can decide which other nodes it wants to communicate with. ALARM takes advantage of some advanced cryptographic primitives to achieve node authentication, data integrity, anonymity and untraceability (tracking resistance). It also offers resistance to certain insider attacks.
.I INTRODUCTION
In the last 10-15 years, research in various aspects of mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETS) has been very active, motivated mainly by allegedly important and numerous applications in law enforcement, military and emergency response scenarios More recently location information has become increasingly available through small and inexpensive GPS receivers. There is also an emerging trend to incorporate location-sensing into personal handheld devices [1] . Combining ad hoc networking with location information facilitates some appealing new applications, such as location-based advertising and focused dissemination of critical information.
If node location information is sufficiently granular, a physical map of a MANET can be constructed and node locations instead of node identities can be used in place of network addresses. In fact, in some application settings such as law enforcement and search and rescue node identities might not be nearly as important as node locations. In addition, if the operating environment is hostile, node identities must not be revealed. We use the term "hostile" to mean that communication is being monitored by adversarial entities which are not part of the MANET. Going a step further, if we assume that the MANET nodes do not even trust each other, perhaps because of possible node compromise (i.e., the environment is "suspicious"), the need to hide node identities becomes more pressing. Moreover, in a suspicious MANET environment, it is natural to require that node movements be obscured, such that tracking a given node (even without knowing its identity) is impossible or, at least, very difficult. While we do not claim that such suspicious and hostile MANET environments are (or will be) common, they do occur in military and law enforcement domains.
In this paper I we consider what it takes to provide secure communication in hostile and suspicious MANETs.
To this end, we construct a framework for Anonymous Location-Aided Routing in MANETs (ALARM) which demonstrates the feasibility of obtaining at the same time, both strong privacy and strong security properties. By privacy properties we mean node anonymity and resistance to tracking. Whereas, security properties include node/origin authentication and location integrity Though it might seem that our security and privacy properties contradict each other, we show that some advancedyet practical -cryptographic techniques can be used to reconcile them.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: We first start by motivating the rneed for such a routirng scheme in section II we then describe the related work in section III. We We first consider reactive routing protocols such as AODV [20] and DSR [19] . In a typical reactive protocol the route discovery phase usually starts with a request by the source node to find a route to a certain destination node. Since the topology is unknown, the request is flooded throughout the network. Anyone (e.g., a passive adversary) observing a route request would infer that communication will be established between the source and the destination specified in the request Also, the entire notion of discovering the destination node is premised on the source knowing the persistent identity or address of the destination. This premise is totally invalid in our MANET scenario since tbe destination is selected based on its location. This brings us to a contradiction: since the destination is selected based on its current location how can a route be discovered before its location is known to the source?
One naive approach is to perform route discovery opportunistically, i.e., the source can specify the destination location and hope that some node is indeed there. This would result in a waste of resources for route discoveries that end up being unsuccessful All in all, since our MANET scenario involves no persistent node identifiers and since nodes are referred to by their current location, a reactive routing protocol is not suitable. Geo-casting routing protocols, such as [2] , are similarly opportunistic since they attempt to deliver messages to a certain geocast region without any certainty of any nodes being within that region.
We can also try adapting a distance vector (DV)
protocol [21] [35] and [36] , [37] . The main challenge arises from the need to reconcile security and privacy (anonymity and untraceability) features which we address below.
Based on the above discussion, we consider the link state approach to be the most amenable to supporting location-based routing with privacy and security features as described in Section I.
III. RELATED WORK
Routing in MANETS has attracted a lot of attention from the networking and security research community. There are numerous proposals for secure on-demand routing, such as SRDP [3] , Ariadne [4] , SEAD [5] , endairA [6] and [7] . They focus mainly on securing route discovery and route maintenance against node impersonation, as well as modification and fabrication of routing information. A comprehensive survey of secure on demand ad-hoc routing techniques can be found in [8] and [9] . We note that they do not consider node privacy and anonymity
Other research results have yielded anonymous ondemand routing protocols, such as SPAAR [10] , ASR [11] , MASK [12] , ANODR [13] , D-ANODR [14] , ARM [15] and ODAR [16] . These protocols use pseudonyms for node identification and addressing but none of them utilizes location information for routing. Location-based routing protocols mainly focus on improving the performance of the routing protocol and minimizing overhead by utilizing location information to deliver routing control messages in MANETs without flooding the whole network. Some notable techniques include [2] , [17] and [18] . To the best of our knowledge, there have been no proposals for location-based proactive routing protocols that preserve node anonymity and privacy.
IV THE ALARM FRAMEWORK
In this section we discuss the proposed ALARM and a group manager's secret key, verifies whether the group signature is valid and returns the signer's group identity and some proof that allows anyone to verify the group identity of the actual signer. It may also return no answer which assumes to mean that the group manager is the signer.
REVOKE: An algorithm, performed by the GM, to remove (revoke) a user from the group. It results in a new group public key and/or a set of auxiliary information aimed at either signers or verifiers. Some recently proposed group signature schemes require less than 10 exponentiations to sign [25] Though still appreciably more expensive than regular signatures, group signatures are rapidly becoming practical. We also point out that, in MANETs, unlike in sensor networks, computation is not a particularly scarce commodity, thus, the cost of 10 exponentiations per group signature is quite reasonable.
C. ALARM. Anonymous Location-Aided Routing
We require an off-line group manager (GM) that initializes the underlying group signature scheme and enrolls all legitimate MANET nodes as group members (This is done well before MANET deployment.) In case of a dispute, the GM is responsible for opening the contested group signature and determining the signer. Depending on the specific group signature scheme, the GM may also have to handle future joins for new members as well as revocation of existing members.
However we claim that in most envisaged MANET scenarios, membership is likely to be fixed, i.e., all joins can be done in bulk, a priori. Also, revocation might not be feasible since it would require propagating in real time -updated revocation information to all legitimate MANET nodes. (However, if dynamic membership is necessary, our scheme is capable of supporting it, with minor additional assumptions.)
The basic operation of ALARM is as follows.
. Time is divided into time slots of duration T. At the beginning of every slot, each node broadcasts a message containing: its location (GPS coordinates), time-stamp temporary public key and a group signature computed over these fields. We call this a Location Announcement Message (LAM). Each LAM is flooded throughout the MANET. Figure  1 shows the LAM format used to construct the network topology snapshot in Figure 2 . . In the period between successive LAM-s, a node can be reached using a pseudonym which is set to the group signature in its last LAM. ( [34] demonstrate a construction that has this additional functionality based on a specific group signature scheme. Another example appears in [42] . The intuition behind these constructions is that each node generating a group signature needs to prove that it is distinct from others. This is achieved by having nodes agree on a common parameter (e.g., a common random number). This parameter is varied in each round of signing (in each time-slot, in our case). ANP is highest when any node can be equally likely mapped to any of the K nodes in the second snapshot of the topology. In this case, ANP will be 1. When each node can only be mapped to one node, then we say that nodes are completely traceable and that the privacy has been violated. In this case an adversary can look at 3The K2 in the denominator normalizes the metric so that it has a maximum value of 1. If nodes move randomly inside an area (L2), which is defined by a square of side length L then ideally the time between snapshots should be long enough so that the slowest node canu travel a distance equal to (vr2 * P 1. 4 L). In this case a node at a location LI in the first snapshot is equally likely to be at any other location L2 in the second snapshot. An adversary that sees these two snapshots and tries to track a certain node's movement Will at most be able to determine the mapping between the first snapshot and the second correctly with probability (1K) (because she is guessing randomly). If the adversary wants to track more nodes the probability of success decreases rapidly. If the adversary wants to track all (K) nodes, the probability of success will be K! In general the probability of tracking i-nodes out of the (K) nodes is: (K! The probability of successfully tracking several nodes by random guessing is shown in Figure 3 . Figure 4 shows the ANP under the random walk mobility model [32] in an area defined by a square of width (1000m2) In this model all nodes move with the same speed but choose their direction to reach as a random destination point inside the area Once a node reaches its destination, it picks a new random destination and starts moving toward it. The number of nodes is varied between 10 and 500. The speed of the nodes is also varied between 0.1 and 1 of the maximum speed.
The maximum speed is defined as v2 8* 10002 and the unit is meter per time duration between two snapshots of the network (two LAM-s). The value of (t) can be either a system parameter, or can depend on the speed that the is large then this number provides an acceptable level of privacy. Figure 5 shows the effect of reduced node speed on ANP when nodes move according to the random way-point model [32] . In this model, all nodes move with the same speed, and upon reaching a destination, a node pauses with probability 0.5 and continues to another randomly selected destination with probability 0.5. If a node pauses, it remains stationary for two inter-LAM intervals, i.e., 2 * t. The adversary examining two subsequent topology snapshots can exclude stationary nodes i.e., those who remain at exactly the same location in both snapshots. The end-result is the reduced ANP. As can be seen from the figure, maximum achievable ANP in this mobility model is 0.6, i.e., a node can be mapped into 60% of all nodes. Figure 6 shows simulation results using the reference point group mobility (RPGM) [43] VII. DIscusSION As described above, ALARM facilitates the dissemination of topology information by flooding LAM-s. Once each node has the whole topology view, it decides whether it wants to send a message to a certain location. Message routing is independent of the MANET topology construction. A node can explicitly embed the locations of nodes that the message should pass through (i.e., location-based source routing). Any other location aided routing algorithm, such as [29] , [30] and [31] , could also be used. If the MANET size increases and flooding causes significant overhead, a hierarchy could be used to limit the scope of flooding. This idea has already been utilized for geocasting in GeoGRID [29] In GeoGRID the network is partitioned into logical grids, with a single elected node acting as a gateway for that partition. Only gateways forward packets to other gateways which limits the scope of flooding. Inside the region for which a gateway is responsible flooding is used.
ALARM takes advantage of group signatures to preserve node anonymity while allowing authentication of location updates. There are many group signature schemes in the literature that differ widely in their security properties and efficiency features. ALARM is not restricted to any particular group signature scheme Any secure group signature scheme can be used as long as attacks are limited to those by active outsiders and passive insiders.
However, if resistance against active malicious insiders (launching Sybil attacks) is desired, then the underlying group signature scheme must be amenable to providing the self-distinction feature discussed earlier. Thus, only certain group signature schemes can be used. Schemes that facilitate the addition of the self-distinction feature include [42] and [34] .
Recent advances in group signature research have resulted in efficient schemes which have constant-size signatures and public keys. There have been proposals to implement group signatures using tamper resistant hardware. The authors in [27] show how to implement group signatures on smart cards. Implementing group signatures using smart cards provides coalition-resistance and provides easy means of revoking group memhers [27] . In this paper, we have constructed the ALARM framework which supports anonymous location-based routing in certain types of suspicious MANETS ALARM relies on group signatures to construct one-time pseudonyms used to identify nodes at certain locations. The framework works with any group signature scheme and any location-based forwarding protocol can be used to route data between nodes. We have shown through simulation that node privacy under this framework is preserved even if a portion of the nodes are stationary, or if the speed of movement is not very high. Future work includes developing an analytical model which captures the loss in node privacy due to the dynamics of the speed and the mobility patterns of nodes inside the MANET.
